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GROUP INSURANCE: AGENCY
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
MASTER POLICY-HOLDER
INTRODUCTION
The advent of group insurance has necessitated judicial inquiry into
the legal relationships of the parties to the group insurance contract.
One of the primary issues encountered by this inquiry has been
whether or not the master policyholder of a group insurance contract
is the agent of the insurer. The cases which have dealt with this issue
are split, some holding that the master policyholder is the agent of the
insurer, others holding that the master policyholder is not the agent
of the insurer, and still others, in addition to holding that the master
policyholder is not the insurer's agent, holding that the master policy-
holder is the agent of the insured. It is the purpose of this comment
to discuss the factors important to an agency characterization and
to formulate some suggestions as to how the issue should be approached
and resolved.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT GROUP
INSURANCE
A. What is Group Insurance?
Group insurance as it is known today is of recent origin. Early
forms of group insurance date back to the time when slave and coolie
merchants were plying the seas with cargos of individuals for sale in
this country.' However, such early examples of group insurance are
distinguishable from present day forms in that the master policy-
holder was the insured, not the individuals making up the group.
The first group insurance policy of the modem variety was issued
in 1911 when the Equitable Life Assurance Society provided coverage
for the lives of the employees of the Pentasote Leather Company.
1. D. GREGG, AN AA. ysis o GRouP INsuRMxcE 4-5 (1950).
2. See text at notes 8-11, injra.
3. D. GRaa, GRouP Lima I SuRANcF 5-7 (3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as GREGG].
For additional information concerning the history of group insurance see Eddy, De-
veloPment and Significance of Group Life insurance and Follman, Development and
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This policy was quite small in comparison to the policy that this same
company issued soon after to Montgomery Ward which covered the
lives of 2,912 employees."
In spite of its comparatively recent origin, group insurance has
grown at a phenomenal rate. For example, in the field of life insurance,
the amount of group insurance in force has grown from $22.2 billion
in 1945 to $391.1 billion in 1967.1 The 1967 figure represented 36%
of all life insurance in force during that year in the United States.6
This fact and the growth rate of this form of insurance have prompted
one commentator to speculate that the number of people insured under
group insurance policies will some day be as large as the number of
people insured by forms of social insurance such as social security.'
Group insurance differs markedly from forms of individual insur-
ance. Some of the broad distinguishing features are:8 (1) the selection
of risks is on a group rather than individual basis; (2) in many in-
stances there is no requirement that applicants wishing coverage sub-
mit to medical examination; (3) the individuals covered by the policy
are within the classification of the group; (4) instead of individual
policies, the individual insureds are insured under one policy issued
to the representative of the group who handles the administration of
the policy; 9 (5) the insureds receive certificates of insurance, rather
than individual policies, which set out the information they need to
know about the scope of their insurance coverage and the conditions
upon which it will terminate;' ° (6) the premiums paid by the group
are experience rated;" and, (7) the cost in comparison to individual
insurance is much lower.
Significance of Group Health Insurance, in GRoup INSURANCE HANDBOOK 54, 57 (R.
Eilers & R. Crowe eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
4. GREco, supra note 3, at 5-7.
5. INSTITUTE or Lin INsuRANcE, LIr INsuRANcE FAcTBooK 20-21 (1968).
6. Id.
7. Gregg, Fundamental Characteristics of the Group Technique, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 31.
8. See generally GREGG, supra note 3, at 3-5; and Gregg in HANDBOOK, supra note 3,
at 32-33.
9. See note 28, infra.
10. See generally Hill, Master Contracts and Certificates, in HANDBOOK, supra note 3,
at 477.
11. See Jackson, Experience Rating in Group Life Insurance, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 213:
Experience rating is the general process whereby the annual premium charged
during the first year for each eligible group in a given rating class is adjusted up-
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There are many forms of groups which seek coverage for their
members. Master policies have been issued to unions and to combina-
tions of unions and employers, creditor-debtor groups, credit card
associations and other groups such as lawyers, dentists, and teacher
associations. 2 'Most group insurance, however, is issued to employer-
employee groups; for example, in 1966, a survey of group life insur-
ance in force during that year found that 85.5% of the group insurance
policies issued covered employer-employee groups.'
There are three basic methods of financing group insurance: non-
contributory, with the entire cost of the premium being paid by the
master policyholder; contributory, with the insured and the master
policyholder each paying part of the premium; and, non-contributory,
with the insured paying the full cost of the premiums. 4 This latter
form of payment is restricted in some states. For example, in the State
of Washington no policy covering an employee group may be issued
where the entire premium is to be derived from funds contributed
by the insured employees. 5
B. Basic Characteristics of the Group Insurance Contract
The group insurance policy is negotiated between the representative
of the group and the insurance company.'" It provides that the insur-
ance company will insure certain risks confronted by the members of
the group. Generally these risks are life, disability and health. Unlike
individual insurance, benefits are not paid to the policyholder but to
those who are insured under the coverage of the policy. The provisions
of group policies are generally uniform within each state since they
ward or downward for subsequent policy years on the basis of the claim experience
that has actually emerged for that group.
12. See GREGG in HANDBOOz, supra note 3, at 10. See also INSTrnTu or Lns IN-
suRnxcE, L INsuRnAc FAcraoox 30 (1968).
State insurance laws determine to an extent the types of groups that are eligible for
group insurance. E.g., WAsH. Rav. CoDE §§ 48.24.020-.070 (1961).
13. INSlrun or Limn INsuRAI cE, L m INsuRA cE FACTBoox 26-27 (1967).
It should be noted that the agency question may be treated differently according to
the kind of group insurance involved. Generally, however, the broad conclusions de-
rived from employer-employee group cases will apply to other forms of group insurance
as well.
14. Gregg in HANDOOox, supra note 3, at 36-38. There are advantages and disadvan-
tages to each of the forms of premium payment. See id. at 38-39.
15. WASH. 1Ev. CoDE §§ 48.24.020(2), -.030, -.035(2), -.050(2) (1969).
16. See, e.g., Rivers v. State Capital Life Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 461, 96 S.E2d 431
(1957).
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are prescribed by state statutes.1 7 The master policyholder is pre-
vented from being a beneficiary under the policy except in the case
of creditor group insurance.'
Once the master contract has been entered into, the eligible mem-
bers of the group may apply to be covered under the terms of the
policy. Upon acceptance of their application, they are issued a certif-
icate of insurance setting out their rights under the policy, the desig-
nated beneficiary, and their rights upon termination, possibly most
important of which is their right to convert the policy into an indi-
vidual insurance contract.19 There is some confusion among the states
as to whether or not the certificate is a part of the insurance con-
tract; the majority rule is that it is not. 0
Unlike a contract of individual insurance which has three parties,
viz., the insurance company, the insured and the beneficiary, a group
contract has four: the insurance company issuing the policy, or the
insurer; the representative of the group which negotiates and obtains
the policy, the master policyholder or policyholder; the individuals of
the group that are covered under the terms of the master contract,
the insureds; and, the party designated to benefit by the insurance,
the beneficiary. 1
In spite of the inclusion of the fourth party-the master policy-
holder-in group insurance, the courts, as a general rule, have viewed
the group insurance contracts in much the same way as they have
viewed individual insurance contracts. In so doing, they have ignored
the insured and have concluded that the insurer and the master policy-
holder are the principals to the insurance contract.2 As a result, the
17. E.g., WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 48.24.100-.200 (1969).
18. E.g., WAsH. REV. CODE § 48.24.040 (1969).
19. Hill in HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 496.
20. See, e.g., Note, Group Insurance; Some Legal Problems, 26 VA. L. REV. 487,
492-93 (1940); All States Life Ins. Co. v. Tilman, 226 Ala. 245, 146 So. 393 (1933);
Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
21. See generally Note, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of Group Insurance
Policies, 36 CoLum. L. RFv. 89, 96 (1936). In some forms of group insurance, such as
health or disability, the beneficiary will be the same party as the insured.
22. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Messier, 173 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1959);
Magee v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 62 N.D. 614, 244 N.W. 518 (1932); Newman v.
Home Life Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 722, 122 S.E.2d 701 (1954). See also 1 J. APPELrAN,
INsuRANcE LAW AND PRAcTiCE 43 (Rev. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as APPEr ];
Note, Cancellation of Group Insurance Policy by Employer Without Consent of Em-
ployee, 49 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1940).
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courts have failed to directly confront the unique problems posed by
the four party relationship of group contracts, the most perplexing
of which is whether the master policyholder is to be regarded as the
agent of the insurer with respect to the administration of the group
policy or as agent to the insureds.
The rule followed in the majority of cases in which the courts have
in one way or the other considered the problem is that the master
policyholder is not the agent of the insurer with respect to procuring
the policy, accepting applications, reporting changes in the group,
paying premiums, transmitting notice of claims, and in doing what-
ever else is required to keep the contract in force.23 The most im-
portant case in which a statement of the majority rule may be found
is Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,24 where the
Court avoided the application of a state statute to an insurance con-
tract on the ground that the contract was entered into outside the
state between the insured and the master policyholder who was acting
as an agent for the insured. Had the Court concluded that the master
policyholder was the insurer's agent rather than that of the insured,
the contract might have been subject to the state law in question.
The minority rule is that the master policyholder acts as the agent
of the insurance company for the purpose of carrying out the admin-
istrative duties required by the group insurance contract in order to
maintain the insurance coverage 5 The leading contemporary case
applying the minority rule is Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance
Company2 There the company employee in charge of administering
the group policy had, at the instruction of the president of the com-
23. E.g., Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.1. 543, 136 A. 400, Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934); Leach v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 124 Kan. 584, 261 P. 603 (1927); Bahas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y 331 Pa. 164,
200 A. 91 (1938) ; Lancaster v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 54 Ga. App. 718, 189 S.E. 79 (1936) ;
Hroblak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio App. 1947); Eason v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 607, 28 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1963); Boger v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co., 259 N.E. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963).
24. 301 US. 196 (1936).
25. E.g., Neider v. Continental Assur. Co., 213 La. 621, 35 So. 2d 237 (1948);
Shanks v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Okla. 1938); General American
Life Ins. Co. v. Gant, 119 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Cason v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954); Piedmont Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527 (1963); Washington National Ins. Co. v.
Burch, 293 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1961).
26. 67 Cal.2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967). See also Walker v. Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co., 62 Cal.2d 518, 432 P.2d 741, 63 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967).
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pany, enrolled an ineligible individual (the president's daughter who
was a part-time employee) to coverage under the terms of the policy.
When the ineligible individual died, the insurer attempted to avoid the
policy as to the deceased on the ground that it contained false repre-
sentations. The California court rejected this contention and, empha-
sizing that individual insureds have no real control over the acts of
the employer with respect to the administration of the policy, con-
cluded that the employer was the agent of the insurer, and as such
the insurer was charged with knowledge of the true facts and there-
fore estopped from denying benefits.2
7
C. Situations in Which the Agency Characterization May be of
Importance
Basically, there are two ways group insurance plans may be adminis-
tered: by the insurer and by the master policyholder. In the former,
the master policyholder collects the necessary information and trans-
fers it to the insurer, who undertakes the administration. In the latter,
the master policyholder performs both the functions of collecting
and administering and the insurer does little except conduct periodic
audits.28
Under master policyholder administered plans, the policyholder
enrolls the insureds, adds and deletes dependents, keeps records of
designated beneficiaries, reinstates and terminates coverage, collects
and remits premiums, etc. Thus, the master policyholder does every-
thing necessary to effect and continue coverage of those individuals
who seek coverage, and in the eyes of the individual insureds the master
policyholder no doubt becomes the representative or agent of the
insurer. Indeed, the master policyholder may even be viewed as the
insurer itself in the view of some of the insureds. The records that do
pass from the master policyholder to the insurer are general in nature,
pertaining to such matters as the calculation and payment of pre-
miums, number of people covered, the amount of insurance in force,
and the specifications of the coverage and kinds of occupations the
27. The case was remanded to determine whether Elfstrom knowingly misrepresented
the fact that his daughter was eligible for coverage under the terms of the policy.
28. GREGG, supra note 3, at 164-71. See also Halverson, Installation and General
Administration o1 Group Plans, in HAxDBooK, supra note 3, at 541.
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insureds are engaged in. This information is used by the insurer in
part to determine the amount of premiums that should be charged 9
The functions undertaken by the master policyholder in this type of
plan are subject to the supervision of the insurer. The insurer usually
sends a representative to check on the records being compiled, lends
assistance in improving practices of administration and encourages
enrollment of more insureds under the plan3 The most important
reason for master policyholder administered plans is the savings in-
volved, enabling the insurer .to provide mass insurance at extremely
low cost. 1  q
In light of the various functions that the master policyholder must
perform under either plan, there are a number of situations in which
the insureds will be affected by the characterization a court may
attach to the legal relationship between the master policyholder and
the insurer. Some of the more litigated situations are set forth in the
following discussion.
1. Master Policyholder Determination of Eligibility
The duties of master policyholder in self-administered insurance
policies generally include the "receipt of the employee's application,
the determination of his insurability as an employee, and of the
amount of consideration to be paid by the insured employee.""2
Whether the master policyholder is considered the agent of the insurer
with regard to his handling of the policy may determine whether or
not an employee who has applied for and is presumably covered under
the terms of the policy really is insured. For example, an employer
may issue a policy to a person who is later found not to have been
an employee 3 If the master policyholder is regarded as the agent
of the insured, the insurer will be able to avoid the policy by asserting
29. GREGG, supra note 3, at 164-71. This information is also used in experience rating.
See note 11, supra.
30. GRExac, supra note 3, at 169. The insurer makes service visits to the master policy-
holder at which times it checks the administration of the plan, helps encourage a high
level of participation, lends assistance in improving administrative procedures and
reviews the terms of the policy to see whether they should be expanded or constricted.
The insurer also performs auditing functions with respect to the records kept by the
policyholder. Id.
31. Id. See also Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731,
63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
32. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir. 1940).
33. Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960) (account-
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that it was issued to a person who was not eligible within the terms
of the policy.34
On the other hand, where the master policyholder is regarded as the
agent of the insurer, the insurer will be charged with the knowledge
of the master policyholder and will be estopped to avoid the coverage
of an individual under the policy.3 5 An example is Piedmont Southern
Life Insurance Co. v. Gunter.3 There, an employee sought coverage
under a group policy for herself and her husband as a dependent.
The master policyholder's comptroller, who was in charge of handling
the matters pertaining' to coverage, had knowledge of a physical dis-
order which would have disqualified the dependent husband but told
the applicant to leave this information out of the application. Based
on this misrepresentation, the insurer attempted to avoid the payment
of benefits. The court in rejecting the contention of the insurer held
that the master policyholder's comptroller was an agent of the insurer,
that knowledge of facts known to the agent would be attributed to
the insurer, and therefore that the policy requirements had been
waived when the certificate had been issued.
2. Failure of the Master Policyholder to Remit Premiums Once De-
ducted to the Insurer
Much group insurance is contributory, with the master policyholder
and the insured each paying a portion of the premium.37 In handling
ant who worked 12 hours a week was held not to have been an employee); John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1940).
34. See, e.g., South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 155 S.E.2d 845 (W.
Va. 1967).
35. See, e.g., Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960).
The question whether the master policyholder is the agent of the insurer for purposes
of determining eligibility arises in other contexts besides that of employee status. An
example is South Branch Valley National Bank v. Williams, 155 S.E.2d 845 (W. Va.
1967). In that case, a bank, as master policyholder of a creditor group policy, collected
insurance premiums from one of its debtors. The collection of the premiums was effected
by one of the bank's cashiers. The debtor later passed away and the bank sought to
collect the debt from the deceased's estate and to collect the benefits of the policy. The
insurer denied liability on the grounds that the policy had been erroneously issued to
the debtor in that the debtor was over the age of sixty-five and the policy provided that
coverage would not be extended to persons over that age. It went on to contend that
the bank's cashier could not waive this provision. The court accepted this point of view
and held that the terms of the policy were clear: the bank's cashier was not the agent
of the insurer and could not waive the terms by accepting premiums from one who
was ineligible.
36. 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527 (1963).
37. Gregg, in HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 39.
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this kind of policy, the master policyholder, usually an employer,
deducts the individual employee's portion of the premium from his
wages and then sends one check to the insurer covering the whole
premium for all insured employees. Since the policy will terminate
if the premiums are not paid, it becomes vitally important whether
the employer is the agent of the insurer for the purpose of collection
and remittance of premiums. The question arises: Is a deduction for
insurance premiums effective for purposes of continuing coverage in
spite of the fact that the employer may not have remitted them to
the insurer? 8 If the employer is treated as the agent of the insurer,
payment to the employer in the form of a deduction from wages will
be considered as payment to the insurance company, and the policy
will not be considered to have lapsed for non-payment.3 9
A similar problem arises where the master policyholder is supposed
to deduct premiums but fails to do so. For example, in General Ameri-
can Life Insurance v. Gant,0 the employer failed to deduct and remit
to the insurer premiums for a one-month period, although it had paid
the premiums for prior and subsequent months. In defending against
a claim on the policy, the insurer contended that the policy had lapsed
due to failure of the master policyholder to pay the premiums for that
one month. The court held the insurer liable on the policy on the
ground that the master policyholder, for the purpose of making deduc-
tions and paying premiums, was the agent of the insurer.4 '
38. See, e.g., Boger v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963).
39. See, e.g., All States Life Ins. Co. v. Tilman, 226 Ala. 245, 146 So. 393 (1933);
Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 296, 91 A.2d 875 (1952); contra Satz v.
Prudential Ins. Co. 225 S.W.2d 480 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1949).
40. 119 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
41. If the policyholder is not treated as the agent of the insurer for the purpose of
deducting and remitting premiums, harsh results may obtain. In Boger v. Prudential
Insurance Co., 259 N.C. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963), the employer deducted premiums
from the employees' wages. It then sent a check to the insurer for the total amount of
the premium due on the policy but the check was returned because of non-sufficient
funds. The court denied a claim for benefits reasoning that the policy had lapsed due to
non-payment of premiums; the employer was not characterized as the agent of the
insurer.
It should be pointed out that in some cases even where the premium has been paid
and accepted by the insurer, the insured may nevertheless find himself without coverage.
In Haneline v. Turner White Casket Company, 238 N.C. 127, 76 S.E.2d 372 (1953), a
premium deduction from an employee's wages was made which paid for coverage up to
June 10. The employee was discharged on March 27 and died on May 16. The court
held that although the premiums had been paid, coverage, according to the terms of
the policy, came to an end in the policy month in which employment ceased. Since the
end of the policy month was April 10, the deceased was no longer insured according
385
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3. Employer's Wrongful Refusal to Accept Premiums for Remittance
The agency question may be important where the master policy-
holder wrongfully refuses to accept premium payments during a period
of disability. For example, in Hanaieff v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society,42 the master policy provided that coverage would continue
during an employee's absence from work due to disability provided the
insurance premiums were kept up. Since the insured was no longer
actively employed he had to present cash payments of premiums. Al-
though the master policyholder accepted a cash premium for one
month, it would not accept advance payments for the next two months.
When the disabled person attempted to pay for the second month's
coverage, his representative was told that since the insured had been
absent from work for thirty days he would have to present a medical
statement of his disability. The company doctor who had treated the
insured refused to give him the report because he did not have a
certificate of birth. Since the insured had been absent from work
without explanation (in reality, the company knew where he was and
why) for thirty days, his employment was terminated along with his
coverage. The court refused to hold the insurer responsible for the
employer's conduct. The court reasoned that the master policyholder
was not the agent of the insurer and that the proper party against
whom a claim should have been brought should have been the negli-
gent employer. Had the court held the employer to be the agent of the
insurer, the insurer would have been held liable regardless of the
employer's negligence.
4. Failure to Include the Name of the Insured on the Insurance Roll
As stated earlier, the master policyholder must send certain infor-
mation to the insurer even in a self-administered policy. This informa-
tion in some instances includes the names of the insureds. The agency
characterization with respect to the policyholder is important where
the name of one who has paid premiums has been excluded from the
roll. If the insured is not listed and the policyholder is regarded as
the agent of the insurer, the exclusion of the insured's name wil not
to the terms of the policy. (However, the court did order the return of the paid up
premiums.)
42. 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952).
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affect his coverage because the insurer will be charged with the
knowledge known to the master policyholder.
On the other hand, if the policyholder is not the agent of the in-
surer, the insured will not be covered. An example of this result is
Blue Cross-Blue Shield v. Fowler,43 in which the court held that even
though the premiums had been deducted and sent to the insurer, the
insured was not included within the coverage of the policy because
the policyholder had failed to include the insured's name in the invoice
of those who were participating in the group plan.
5. Failure of the Master Policyholder to Provide Notice of Disability
The agency characterization may become important in a situation
where the policyholder fails to transmit information regarding the
disability of the insured. Group insurance contracts may provide for
continued coverage and continued payment of benefits during the
period in which the insured is not working because of disability.44
Such extended benefits are conditioned upon notice to the insurer as
to the reason and kind of disability. Usually the information is sent
to the insurer by the master policyholder, and if the policyholder is
characterized as the agent of the insurer its failure to send the in-
formation will not be charged to the insured.45 Where the policyholder
is not characterized as the insurer's agent the opposite result may be
reached.46 Of course this can be quite harsh. An example is Bahas v.
Equitable Life Assurance Societyf7 where the insured attempted to
provide the necessary notice directly to the insurer. The insurer would
not receive the notice and directed the insured to file notice of his
disability with the master policyholder, in this case a union. He did
so, but did not file all of the necessary information. He was led to
believe that if anything more was required, the union would contact
him. The union never did, and the insurer was able to show that the
policy provisions had not been met. Therefore, there was no insurance
coverage.
43. 195 So.2d 910 (Ala. App. 1966), cert. denied, 195 So.2d 919 (1967).
44. See W. VAlecE, INSURANE 1038-39 (3d ed. 1951).
45. See, e.g., Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. App.
1939).
46. See, e.g., Dewease v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 732, 182 S.E. 447 (1935).
47. 331 Pa. 164, 200 A. 91 (1931).
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6. Waiver of the Notice of Disability Provision
The agency issue is also important with reference to whether the
master policyholder can waive the provisions of the policy that require
notice of disability. A hypothetical example might be as follows: The
insured is injured on the job and fails to return to work due to some
form of disability. The policy provides that coverage will continue
for ninety days after disability, provided notice is given to the policy-
holder. The insured attempts to provide the necessary notice to the
policyholder but is prevented from doing so because the policyholder's
comptroller incorrectly believes that the insured's coverage under the
policy has lapsed by reason of his failure to pay premiums. In such
case, if the policyholder is characterized as the agent of the insured,
the coverage would be terminated. However, if the policyholder is
regarded as the agent of the insurer it might be argued that the state-
ment of the comptroller regarding the futility of sending notice con-
stituted a waiver of the notice requirements."
While there are more,49 the foregoing situations indicate how the
agency characterization of the master policyholder may make a dif-
ference. It is obvious that the insured will in most cases benefit from
the characterization of the master policyholder as agent of the insurer;
for example, the insured's coverage will not be terminated due to the
master policyholder's failure and negligence in deducting and remit-
ting premiums, including the insured's name on the roll, accepting
premiums once submitted, transmitting notice of disability, trans-
mitting notice of claims, providing necessary information regarding
coverage, or generally leading one to believe he is covered under the
48. C.f., Hroblak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio App. 1947).
49. There are situations, other than those discussed, in which the agency characteriza-
tion may be of some importance. For example, an agency characterization might be
important in determining whether the insured is entitled to some notice when the insurer
and master policyholder modify or cancel their relationship. See Note, The Requirement
of Notice to an Employee of the Termination or Cancellation of His Group Policy, 42
NoTRE DAmE LAWYER 523, 524-25 (1967). Further examples are situations where the
master policyholder fails for some reason to change a beneficiary or fails to send timely
notice of a claim.
Apart from the situations discussed, there are other contexts in which the agency
characterization may he important. The question might arise in a case where the primary
issue is to determine what state's law will apply to the determination of rights and
liabilities to the insurance contract. E.g. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1936). The question might also arise where the state insurance com-
missioner is seeking to determine whether an insurer is doing business in the state. See W.
VAcE, INsuRAxc 1040 (3d ed. 1951).
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terms of the master policy when in fact he is not. It is submitted that,
at least in those situations discussed, the more equitable result usually
follows from the characterization of the master policyholder as agent
of the insurer.!'
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE AGENCY
CHARACTERIZATION
A. Factors Important in the Characterization
1. The Nature of the Group Insurance Contract
The manner in which a court views the four party group insurance
contract (insurer, master policyholder, insured, and beneficiary) will
in most instances answer the question of whether or not the policy-
holder is the agent of the insurer. The courts have taken two basic
approaches in answering this question.5" Some courts have failed to
give any legal recognition to the middle position of the master policy-
holder, while other courts have recognized the curious middle position
played by the master policyholder and have dealt directly with the
question of whether the relationship should be characterized as one of
agency. Under the first approach, there is said to be only two parties
to the contract, the insurer and the master policyholder. The assump-
tion is that the insured is the group entity and not the mere individual
insureds who hold certificates of insurance.52 Thus, characterization
of the master policyholder, who represents the group entity, as the
insurer's agent is impossible because the master policyholder is a
principal to the contract and there can be no agency between
principals.!'
An example of this approach is Equitable Life Assurance Society v.
50. See 1 APPEL A , supra note 22, § 43 (1965) ; Clauson v. Prudential Ins. Co. 195 F.
Supp. 72 (D. Mass. 1961); Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d
731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
51. See text at note 22, supra. See also W. V.xc IwsuRssw 1042 (1951).
52. See, e.g., Magee v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 62 ND. 614, 244 N.W. 518 (1932);
Layman v. Continental Assur. Co., 416 Pa. 155, 205 A.2d 93 (1964).
53. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Messier, 173 F. Supp. 90 (D. Pa. 1959). In those cases
which adopt this view, the statement is sometimes made that the insured as a third
party beneficiary of the contract has no power to keep the master policy in force or to
abrogate it. See Millers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Pa. Super. 270, 17 A.2d 907 (1940).
See also note 52, supra.
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Hall.514 In this case the insured sought to recover disability payments
from the insurance company. The insurer denied coverage on the
ground that the policy precluded disability benefits to anyone who
was over the age of sixty when he applied for coverage. The insured
assented to the fact that he was over the age of sixty when he applied
for insurance, but contended that the master policyholder, as the in-
surer's agent, knew this and that the insurer by accepting the appli-
cation and premiums acquiesced and was therefore estopped from
denying coverage. The court refused to accept the argument that the
employer was the insurer's agent, pointing out that the contract was
between the insurer and the master policyholder, and that, if anything,
the master policyholder was the agent for the insured. Accordingly, the
court held that the insurer was not bound by the facts known to the
master policyholder.
In spite of the fact that a court may view the contract in conven-
tional contract terms, the master policyholder may still be regarded
as the agent of the insurer. Duval v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
is an example." There, insurance coverage under the group policy was
to be effective during the employment of the insured. The deceased
worked until June 11th and drowned on June 17th. The named bene-
ficiary sought to show that deceased had been insured at the date of
his death since prior to the drowning deceased had been reinstated,
and that this nullified the earlier June 11th termination. The bene-
ficiary relied upon eight provisions of the group policy to show
that the employer-policyholder had the actual authority to reactivate
the insurer's liability to the deceased, but the court rejected these
arguments.
However, the court did concede in dicta that under the terms of
the contract the master policyholder could be regarded as the agent
of the insured for some purposes, noting that a provision in the
contract requiring the employer to send the insurer a list of applicants
created an agency for the purpose of receiving applications. Closely
related to this is the position taken in some opinions that "persons not
regularly appointed agents or acting solely for the benefit of the com-
54. 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934).
55. 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927).
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pany [insurer] must be regarded as agents of the insured." 6 How-
ever, as will be discussed later, the fact that the policyholder is not
designated as the insurer's agent within the terms of the contract
should not be determinative of whether its actions with regard to the
policy should be charged to the insurer.5 7
A second view of the group contract recognizes that the master
policyholder stands in a curious middle position between the insurer
and the insured, performing functions for each, and that, for the func-
tions performed for the insurer, the master policyholder is the insurer's
agent.58 This approach is a more realistic one since it adopts a view
which is less rigid and it gives recognition to the realities of group
insurance contracts, viz., that the individual insured only has con-
tact with the insurer through the offices of the master policyholder.
2. Aligning the Interests of the Parties
The general rationale for the majority rule-that the master policy-
holder is not the agent of the insurer-is the thought that the master
policyholder is aligned with the insureds due to their identity of in-
terests.59 The statement is frequently made that the employer holds
the master policy, not for, but rather against, the insurer,60 and thus
the policyholder cannot be regarded as the agent of the insurer. This
identity of interests arises from the common impression that employers
are acting for themselves and their employees in procuring group in-
surance for the employees.61 Thus, as one court put it:12
The line dividing the three parties to the contract according to
their interest and real position in these transactions puts the
employer with the employee, as opposed to the insurer.
56. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Messier, 173 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1959), citing 1 AppEL-
mAx § 43 (1965).
57. See notes 93-111, infra.
58. Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (1967).
59. E.g., Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927).
Contra, Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 35 (1967).
60. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 527, 76 N.W.2d 311 (1956).
61. Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 US. 196 (1937); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Messier, 173 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1959).
62. Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400, 404 (1927).
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While it cannot be denied that the employer is acting for its em-
ployees in obtaining a contract of insurance, the premise upon which
the foregoing statement is based-that the employer is the employee's
benevolent parent-is open to sharp criticism. In reality, the employer's
motives can be expected to be self-serving. Group insurance provides
many advantages to the employer: except in the case of non-contrib-
utory policies with the insureds paying the entire premiums, it is pos-
sible to increase the amount of money paid to employees without
increasing their tax burden; it is a means of competing with other
employers paying similar wages; it is a means of establishing employee
loyalty because it causes the employee to have a better image of his
employer and causes him to be hesitant to change jobs because of the
fear of losing insurance benefits. 3
The cases which align the interests of the policyholder with those of
the insureds come to the general conclusion that under no circum-
stances can the employer act as the insurer's agent except where the
contract specifically so provides. However, there are some opinions
which, in spite of supporting the foregoing interests approach, have
held that for some purposes the master policyholder may act as the
insurer's agent. The reasoning is that where the master policyholder
does not stand in a position adverse to the insurer, a master policy-
holder-insurer agency may be found.64
The rationale that the master policyholder acts either for his own
benefit or for that of the insureds leads to the negative implication that
the policyholder, by performing the administrative tasks of the policy,
does not act in any way for the insurer's benefit. Consequently, it would
seem that if it could be shown that the insurer benefits as much as the
insured by having the master policyholder perform these administra-
tive functions, the alignment of the policyholder with the insured might
63. See generally 36 CoLum. L. REv. 89 (1936); Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17, 1969,
at 1, col. 1.
64. E.g., Kaiser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 527, 76 N.W.2d 311 (1956) where
the question presented to the court was whether the employer was the agent of the
insurer with respect to an application for a change of beneficiary. The master policy
required that beneficiary changes be submitted to the employer. The court adopted the
position that for purposes adverse to the insurer such as determining the amount of the
premium, the employer would not be characterized as the agent of the insurer. However,
the court went on to state that the employer had no interest adverse to the insurer with
respect to whom the benefits of a policy were to be paid and, therefore, concluded
that for the purpose of accepting changes in beneficiaries the employer was the agent
of the insurer.
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fall and the policyholder might, in turn, be characterized as the agent
of the insurer.
This appears to be the position taken by the California Supreme
Court in Elfstrom. 5 The court, in rejecting the reasoning supportive of
the majority rule, stated: 6
It cannot be said that the employer acts entirely for its own benefit
or for the benefit of its employees in undertaking administrative
functions. While a reduced premium may result if the employer
relieves the insurer of these tasks, and this, of course, is advan-
tageous to both the employer and the employees, the insurer also
enjoys significant advantages from the arrangement. The reduc-
tion in the premium which results from employer-administration
permits the insurer to realize a larger volume of sales, and at the
same time the insurer's own administrative costs are remarkably
reduced.
It should be cautioned that a black and white approach to the align-
ment of benefits can be illusory. There are benefits accruing to all
parties to a group contract when a master policyholder performs ad-
ministrative functions and, therefore, any alignment of interests is at
best tenuous.
3. Cost
Cost is another factor used in characterizing the legal role of the
master policyholder. Cases which have held that the master policy-
holder is not the agent of the insurer have made reference to two cost-
related arguments. First, cost has been used with reference to the
benefit rationale. The courts point out that self-administered plans
effect a cost savings in the insurer's overhead, making it possible
to issue group insurance at a very low premium and thereby directly
benefit the insured. In light of this direct benefit, the courts taking
this position find it difficult to conclude that the master policyholder
is acting for the insurer in undertaking to perform various administra-
tive tasks.
Secondly, the proponents of the majority position argue that treating
65. 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
66. 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (1967).
67. See, e.g., Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Ca.2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63
Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
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the master policyholder as the agent of the insurer will cause the cost
of group insurance to increase.6" This increase would assertedly be due
to two factors: (1) the insurer would have to perform a greater func-
tion with respect to the administration of the policy thereby increasing
its overhead, and (2) the insurer would, because of its responsibility
for the actions of the master policyholder, have to issue benefits to
a greater number of claimants claiming under policies which should
not have been issued or continued.
As to the first assertion, it is doubtful that an agency relationship
between the insurer and the policyholder will actually cause admin-
istrative overhead to rise, or rise to the extent that the use of group
insurance would be discouraged. In spite of the adoption of the minor-
ity rule in certain jurisdictions, large amounts of group insurance are
still being sold.69 Indeed, it may even be the case that the insurer, in
conducting audits and giving administrative advice, is already doing
all that he would have to do.7 0
The second assertion-that there will be an increase in claims
resulting in the payment of more benefits-is not a valid argument
against the adoption of an insurer-policyholder agency since even
though the insurer will be responsible for the actions of the master
policyholder, and thus will have to pay on policies it might otherwise
have avoided under the majority rule, nevertheless, the insurer will
be able to recover from the master policyholder on theories of breach
of contract or negligence where the policyholder has failed to properly
perform his duties. However, even if it were true that the adoption of
an insurer-policyholder agency would increase the cost of group insur-
ance, the increase may be well worth it if at the same time it improves
group insurance. As one commentator has put it:
71
It must be remembered, however, that the cheapness of group
insurance is supposed to spring from economies produced by the
nature of the device, such as the elimination of medical examina-
tions, and the savings in agents commissions and administration
expense attendant on insuring many persons at once. If group in-
surance can be kept cheap only by being kept inferior, then its
68. Id.
69. See Note, Group Insurance Policies: The Employer/Insurer Agency Relationship,
1968 DuKE L.J. 824.
70. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
71. Hanft, Group Life Insurance: Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 70,
90 (1935).
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cheapness is deceptive. ... Group insurance would deserve no
place as a new social device if it constituted nothing more than
the bargain basement of insurance companies.
4. Control
Courts which have characterized the policyholder as the agent of
the insurer have placed much emphasis on the insured's lack of control
over the actions of the policyholdery 2 In Elf strom the court stated:73
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the em-
ployer acts as the agent of the insurer, however, is that the employee
has no knowledge of or control over the employer's actions in
handling the policy or its administration.
As will be discussed,7 4 the court used this control factor with refer-
ence to an agency test. However, it better describes an equitable con-'
sideration that one should not be bound by the acts of persons over
whom he has no control. Thus, for example, an insured should not lose
his coverage under the group policy where the employer, after having
deducted premiums, fails to remit them to the insurer.
The control factor has the most relevance in an employer-employee
relationship since the employee is not likely to question his employer
as to whether or not he is performing the functions required by the
policy. Query, however, as to what would be the case where the group
was a labor union. It might be argued that the insured as a member of
the group has control over the master policyholder. This situation
points out that control should not mean group control-employees as
a group have some control over their employer-but rather individual
control. That is, where one does not have effective control as an indi-
vidual over the administration of the group policy under which he
believes he is covered, it appears to be proper to hold that his coverage
would not be affected by mistakes and failures of the master policy-
holder.
A most graphic example of complete inability to control the master
policyholder is a situation where a holder of a credit card pays pre-
72. See, e.g., Hanaieff v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952)
(Musmanno, 3., dissenting).
73. Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal.
Rptr. at 42.
74. See text accompanying notes 104-111, ifara.
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miums for coverage under a policy issued to the credit card issuer and
later finds that the credit card company failed to include his name
on the list sent to the insurer of people who had paid premiums. It
would hardly be equitable for the insured not to be able to collect
from the insurer since there was nothing further he could have done to
ensure that he was covered. Closely related to this idea of control is
that in dealing with the insurance company the insured is usually re-
quired to direct his dealings through the master policyholder. Conse-
quently, the insured is led to believe that he should refer only to the
master policyholder when he has a problem related to his coverage and
that there is little he can do when the master policyholder is being
uncooperative. Justice Musmanno, dissenting in Hanaieff v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, made the following statement:75
Here we have the clearest case of a man dealing wholly and exclu-
sively with his employer, the steel company, not even knowing
of the existence of the insurance company.
* .. It was the insurance company which required that the in-
sured pay the premiums to the steel company, and the premiums
were so paid until the collecting agency by demanding an impos-
sible and superfluou8 birth certificate, lowered a steel curtain in
the face of decedent's conscientious attempt to meet the insurance
company's requirements.
Neither the lower court nor the majority opinion points out any
duty devolving upon the insured which was not fulfilled. To now
withhold from the insured's beneficiary the money which he paid,
through the steel company, into the coffers of the insurance com-
pany, is in my opinion a grave injustice.
This closely follows the rule of agency that where a principal places
a person in a position where a reasonable man dealing with that person
is led to believe that he is an agent of the principal, the principal, as
against the third person, is estopped from contending that that person's
authority is less that it appeared."6
It has been suggested that one counter to the effects of such a rule
would be a provision in the insurance contract, or the individual
75. 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202, 206 (1952).
76. Id., citing 2 Am. J-R. Agency 104-05 (1936).
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certificate, designating the master policyholder as the insured's agent.7
However, the relations of the parties in an area as important as this
should be determined by public policy based on the reality of the facts
and not by contractual boiler plate.78
5. Statutes
Some decisions holding the master policyholder the agent of the
insurer have relied in part on statutes which generally provide that
one who transmits any application, delivers policies of insurance,
or receives or collects premiums will be considered the agent of the
insurer."9 As yet, this type of statute has not been used as the sole
grounds for finding an insurer-policyholder agency relationship. 0 It
is conceivable, however, that in a situation other than an employer-
employee group policy, where the relation between the insureds and
master policyholder is not as close, primary reliance might be placed
on such a statute.8'
Reliance upon a statute of this kind has had a unique history in
Georgia. In Cason v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 2 the court, relying
in part on such a statute, held that a municipality-master policyholder
was the agent of the insurer. In 1961, a new insurance code became
effective in Georgia which, in defining "agent," provided that a person
who serves the master policyholder in keeping and administering the
group policy and who does not receive a commission from the insurance
company is not the insurance company's agent.83 In Piedmont South-
77. See Borst, Group Policyholder as Agent of Insurer or Group Member, 14 Fm.
OF INs. CousarE. Q. 11, 30 (1963-64).
As a practical solution, it is suggested that in individual group member applications,
the member designate and constitute the policyholder as his agent for all purposes
in connection with administration of the group policy.
78. See text accompanying notes 120-24, infra.
79. E.g., GA. CODE Am. § 56-801a(1) (1960); OxrA. STAT. Amx. tit. 36, § 1302
(1958); TEx. INs. CODE art. 21.02 (1963).
80. See Cason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954); Borst,
supra note 77, at 23-30. But see Shanks v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 74 (N.D.
Okla. 1938), followed in Voris v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Okla. 1939).
81. For example, where the group is not a real group entity, such as a credit card
group in which the policyholder is in reality selling insurance, this kind of statute may
be used to treat the policyholder as the insurer's agent.
82. 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954).
83. GA. CODE AsN. § 56-801a (1963) provides:
[U]nder a group insurance plan, a person who serves the master policyholder of
group insurance in administering the details of such.insurance for the employees or
debtors of such person, or a firm or corporation by which he is employed, and who
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ern Life Insurance Co. v. Gunter,84 the insurance company argued
that this statute changed the earlier Georgia law relied upon in Cason
to the effect that the master policyholder could not be regarded as
the agent of the insurer. The court rejected this argument stating that
the new statute dealt only with the licensing of insurance agents, ex-
empting those persons working for master policyholders from being
agents who must be licensed, and in no way changing the prior law
whereby a policyholder was considered to be the agent of the insurer.
Thus if anything, the legislative exemption was legislative recognition
of the master policyholder-insurer agency.
The statutory development in Georgia has importance with regard
to a problem which has not been discussed in the cases dealing with the
issue of whether the policyholder is the agent of the insurer. This is
the possible fear that multiple state regulation of group insurance
contracts might be a result of treating the policyholder as the agent
of the insurer. An argument may be made that since the master policy-
holder is regarded as the insurer's agent, the state insurance com-
missioner may be able to require the insurer to be licensed. Such a
result would lead to multi-state regulation which in turn might make
it difficult for an insurer to issue a group insurance policy to a multi-
state employer. 85
This fear of multiple state regulation is not an unreasonable one.
However, the Georgia statutory experience indicates that a simple
solution would be the enactment of legislation specifically exempting
the master policyholder as agent for purposes of licensing. Also, it
should be pointed out that an agency for the purposes of licensing
is far different from an agency for the purposes of making the insurer
liable for the acts of the policyholder with respect to his administra-
tion of the policy.
B. The Role of Precedent
A possible criticism of some of the cases which have held that the
master policyholder is not the agent of the insurer is their seemingly
does not receive insurance commissions for such service, shall not be deemed to be
an agent ....
84. 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527 (1963).
85. See generally King, Proper Situs of Multi-State Group Policies (Paper read before
Association of Life Insurance Counsel at The Greenbriar, White Sulphur Springs, W.
Va., May 9, 1961).
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blind adherence to precedent. In many decisions, the courts appear
to have looked mechanically to prior cases and have neglected gen-
uine discussion of the merits.3 6 For example, it is not too unusual to
find a court, citing a previous case and quoting or paraphrasing
language found in that case, to conclude that the master policyholder
is not the agent of the insurer for purposes of policy administration.87
The two cases most frequently relied upon are Duval v. Metropolita(
Life Insurance Co.8 8 and Boseman v. Connecticut General Life In-
surance.
8 9
Not only have the courts which have relied upon these prior cases
not discussed the relative merits of each position, but they have not
considered factors relating to these cases which might tend to di-
minish their value as precedent. For instance, in Duval the court
was of the impression that the employer was acting in a paternalistic
manner toward its employees in procuring group insurance. This case
was decided in 1927, and perhaps this view was substantially correct
then. Today however, because of the large volume of group insurance,
the employer is probably not motivated by mere paternalism but
rather by competitive necessity to provide group insurance as a fringe
benefit."
A factor diminishing the precedential value of the cases citing
Boseman is that the context of those decisions is not analogous to
that of the Boseman case. In Boseman an employee, who was a Texas
resident, sought to recover disability benefits under a group policy
which had been issued in Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvania corporation,
which was the corporate parent of plaintiff's Texas employer. The
policy required that notice of disability be given within a certain time
period, and the insured employee failed to comply with this provision.
The plaintiff contended that he did not have to comply because, ac-
cording to the law of Texas, the notice provision of the policy was
void. Therefore the issue before the Coirt was whether the policy
was governed by the law of Texas, and the Court concluded that it
was not, on the grounds that the employer rather than the insurer
86. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934).
87. Id.
88. 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927).
89. 301 U .S. 196 (1936).
90. See note 65, supra.
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did all that was necessary to effect coverage of the insureds and thus
the insurer was not doing business in Texas. In reaching this conclu-
sion the Court stated:91
When procuring the policy, obtaining applications of employees,
taking payroll deduction orders, reporting changes in the insured
group, paying premiums and generally in doing whatever may
serve to obtain and keep the insurance in force, employers act
not as agents of the insurer but for their employees or for them-
selves.
Although the decision was unanimous and although the Court cited
cases which have reached the same result outside the conflict of laws
context,92 it may nevertheless be posited that since the Court was
using the agency argument for the purpose of preventing multi-state
regulation of insurance policies, the above quoted statement should
not be used as the ultimate authority for the argument that the master
policyholder is not the agent of the insurer for all purposes. Further,
such statement ignores the possibility that for some purposes, the
contract might expressly regard the master policyholder as the agent
of the insurer.
C. Contractual Attempts to Avoid Agency Characterization
In some instances, the terms of the insurance contract may be re-
ferred to by the courts to aid them in their attempt to determine
whether the master policyholder is the agent of the insurer. 3 Con-
sequently, it has been suggested that the agency characterization may
be affected if the contract of insurance provided an answer to the
inquiry. 9
4
A case considering the effects of express contractual provisions and
giving support to them is Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v.
Fowler.95 In that case plaintiff was insured under a group health
91. 301 U.S. at 204-05.
92. See 301 U.S. at 205 n.8.
93. Duval v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 A. 400 (1927) ; Blue Cross-
Blue Shield of Ala. v. Fowler, 195 So. 2d 910 (Ala. App. 1966), cert. denied, 280 Ala. 708,
195 So. 2d 919 (1967).
94. Borst, supra note 77; Note, Group Insurance Policies: The Employer/Insurer
Agency Relationship, 1968 DuK:E L.J. 824, 827.
95. 195 So. 2d 910 (Ala. App. 1966), cert. denied, 280 Ala. 708, 195 So. 2d 919 (1967).
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insurance plan under which the employer was to deduct and remit
premiums to the insurer. Plaintiff's employment had been interrupted
due to a layoff, during which time she had paid the premiums directly
to the insurance company. Upon return to work, premiums were once
again deducted from her wages; however, at this time the employer
failed to include the plaintiff's name on the premium invoice which
it periodically sent to the insurer. Plaintiff contended that once the
premium had been deducted she was covered by the insurance policy
regardless of the fact that her name was not sent to the insurer. The
lower court accepted this position and gave instructions to the jury to
the effect that payment to the employer would be payment to the
insurer whether or not the premiums deducted were actually re-
mitted." On appeal, this instruction was held to be in error because
it was contrary to an express provision in the contract.
The basis for the lower court's instruction was an earlier group
insurance case which had held that the employer was the agent of
the insurer for purposes of accepting premiums.17 The court in Fowler
indicated that this prior law was not effective under the facts of this
case since the contract provided that the "remitting agent" could not
bind the insurer by its mistakes. The contract treated the employer
as the agent of the insured by providing that the remitting agent
would be the agent of the subscriber and, in addition, it stated that
the insurer would not be responsible for the failure of the remitting
agent to pay the premiums when due."
In finding that these policy provisions should be given effect, the
court quoted a passage from an earlier case to the effect that insurance
companies, in order to determine the extent of the risk they have
undertaken, have the right to write policies of narrow coverage. The
court stated:99
Our cases recognize the same right of insurance companies
(statutory provisions to one side) as individuals to limit their
liability and to impose such conditions as they wish upon their
96. 195 So. 2d at 914.
97. 195 So. 2d at 914, citing All States Life Ins. Co. v. Tilhman, 226 Ala. 245, 146
So. 393 (1933).
98. 195 So. 2d at 911.
99. 195 So. 2d at 914, quoting from Rodgers v. Commercial Cas. Co., 237 Ala. 301,
186 So. 684 (1939).
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obligations, not inconsistent with public policy, and that the
courts are without right to add or subtract therefrom. The com-
panies have the right to write contracts with narrow coverage,
and a small premium fixed on careful calculation of the hazard
assumed. And we have said, speaking of such contracts, that they
should be enforced, not a new or enlarged contract made for the
parties.
Upon rehearing, the court stated that there was no public policy
which would prevent the insurer from limiting its liability by using a
contractual provision making the remitting agent the agent of the
employee. The court further pointed out that the earlier case holding
that the employer was the agent of the insurer did not set "up a
rule of prohibition against the language used" since it only set up a
rule of construction which should be applied when the group contract
is silent regarding the characterization of the employer. 00 Without
specific statutory language the court would not "ignore the plain words
of the contract."'' 1
This case appears to be a clear statement that where the contract
of insurance specifically labels the employer as the agent of the em-
ployee, rather than that of the insured, it will be given effect in spite
of case law to the contrary. A point that should be made with ref-
erence to Fowler is that the court seemed to view the label given the
employer in the contract as coinciding with the realities of the situa-
tion; to the court, the employer in reality did play the role as the
agent of the employees. This conclusion is based on the fact that the
court viewed the insurance contracts as being separate contracts be-
tween the insurer and the employees, and, unlike regular group con-
tracts in which the employer is the "owner" of the policy of insurance,
here the employee was the "owner." The conclusion of the court was
that0 2
The instant arrangement is not group insurance but rather
a group of employees who remitted premiums collectively for
themselves.
In its application for rehearing, the appellee (plaintiff below) empha-
100. 195 So. 2d at 918.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 915.
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sized that the insurance was indeed group insurance and that, con-
trary to the court's opinion, the employer was not the agent of the
employees since the employees had no control over the actions of the
employer with respect to the deduction and remittance of premiums.
As to this latter point, the appellee grounded his position on the fact
that the insurer had regularly sent the employer a list setting out and
describing the premiums which were due. The court rejected the ap-
plication for rehearing.' 0 3 It pointed out that the employer was not
controlled by the insurer with respect to the lists which were sent to
it since the lists were merely the previous month's lists sent in by the
employer. The implication was that the employer was the employee's
agent and that the contractual label conformed to the role actually
played.
In a case where the contractual label does not fit the role played
by the employer in the eyes of the court, such provisions might be
found nugatory. For example, in Elfstrom v. New York Life Insurance
Co.,'04 the court placed primary emphasis on the fact that the em-
ployees have no control over the actions of the employer with respect
to the administration of the group policy. According to the court, an
agency relationship depends on "consent by one person -that another
shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control."'1 5 Using this
test, the court found that the employer could be characterized as the
agent of the insurer, and could not be characterized as the agent of
the employees because the insurer rather than the employees directs
the performance of the administrative acts and has the power of con-
trol.10 6 Obviously, the concern here is with the actual relationship
between the parties and not with the label which the contract may
place upon the part the employer might play.
Thus, in a case where the court is willing to look at the real re-
lationship and finds that the employees have no control over the ac-
tions of the master policyholder, the characterization of the employer
as an agent of the insurer should not be defeated or reversed by a
provision in the contract to the contrary. Note, however, that a court
103. 280 Ala. 708, 95 So. 2d 919 (1967).
104. 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
105. 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
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willing to give expression to this approach should also be alert to
the contrary need of insurers to be able to write narrow contracts
so that they may be able to determine the extent of the risk they
are undertaking to insure.10 7
A troublesome feature about Elfstrom is that the agency re-
lationship is based on "consent" and "control." 0 8 The question posed
is whether a "consent" on the part of the employees in their applica-
tions for coverage that the employer will be their agents for the
purposes of administration will be effective to avoid a judicially created
rule to the contrary. It would seem that such a question would be
answered in the negative in that in the agency test expressed by the
court, consent and control are conjunctive rather than disjunctive
elements.
Apart from the considerations advanced in the foregoing paragraphs,
another contractually related attempt to avoid the characterization of
the master policyholder as agent of the insurer might be to place
in the insurance contract the provisions which have the effect of con-
trolling the actions of the master policyholder with respect to the
fulfillment of his administrative duties. For instance it has been sug-
gested that the insurer reserve in the contract the right to determine
the eligibility of the applicants and the right to make regular audits
of the master policyholder's records.0 9 These kinds of provisions
would not prevent the court from characterizing the master policy-
holder as the agent of the insurer. In fact, they may have the opposite
effect since the court might consider such restrictions as attempts to
limit the authority of one who is an admitted agent performing func-
tions that are insurer's functions."0
An example of how a court might treat these provisions is found
in Elstrom. There, the insurer's representative was empowered to
make an annual audit to determine whether the employees were being
insured according to the provisions of the policy. The court relied
107. See text accompanying note 99, supra.
108. 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967).
109. See Note, Group Insurance Policies: The Employer/Insurer Relationship, 1968
DuKE L.J. 824, 827.
110. Where the insurer places a number of provisions in the policy which may be
used to reserve final authority over the master policyholder, it may be argued that such
reservation of authority is a recognition on the part of the insurer that the master
policyholder is its agent.
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upon this fact as support for the proposition that the insurer had
control over the master policyholder rather than the insureds. There-
fore, it could be argued that the provisions relating to the power of
the insurer to control the actions of the master policyholder empha-
size the fact that since the insurer rather than the insured is in a
position to control the actions of the employer, it should take the
responsibility for those actions.111 In summary, provisions restricting
the actions of the master policyholder may be positive criteria upon
which to found an insurer-master policyholder agency relationship.
D. Rights of the Insured Against the Master Policyholder"12
It was stated earlier that an insurer-master policyholder agency
relationship is often a more equitable conclusion."3 Additional sup-
port for this conclusion comes from the fact that where an insured
or his beneficiary may be injured as a result of the master policy-
holder's neglect, he might find that he does not have a cause of action
against the master policyholder; that even if he does, the damage
remedy may be inadequate; and, that in any case, it is inequitable to
place the insured or the beneficiary in a position where he has to seek
the advice and services of an attorney.
Where an employment contract includes group insurance, the fail-
ure of the employer to provide it would be an actionable breach of
the employment contract."4 For example, in Peyton v. U.S. Steel
Co." 5 the employer undertook to deduct premiums from the employ-
ees' wages but failed to remit them to the insurer. The policy lapsed
and the employer, on the basis of the employment contract which in-
111. In Elistrom, the court used the provisions to show that the insurer did indeed
have control over the master policyholder whereas the insured did not. 432 P.2d at 738,
63 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
112. The discussion which follows will deal only with cases where the master policy-
holder is an employer and the insured is an employee.
113. See text accompanying notes 49-50, supra. See also 1 APPEL AN § 43 at 56
(1965); Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 432 P.2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr.
35 (1967).
114. See generally E. CAw 0RD & S. HARLAN, TnE LAW Or GROUP InsuARmcE § 61
(1936); Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1461 (1933).
See, e.g., Sims Motor Trans. Lines v. Davis, 126 Ind. App. 344, 130 N.E.2d 82 (1955).
115. 368 Pa. 591, 84 A.2d 192 (1951). See also Best v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'.y,
165 Pa. 452, 68 A.2d 400 (1949); Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115
So. 94 (1927); 1 ApPrmaw § 43 at 57-58 (1965). The employer may not owe the
beneficiary the same duty.
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cluded group insurance, was held liable to the beneficiary in the
amount he would have received had the policy been kept in force.
Where, however, there is no clear duty, contractual or otherwise,
to provide group insurance or keep it in force, it is unclear whether
a master policyholder could be held responsible to pay the damages
resulting from its failure to maintain a policy. It has been stated that
the employer, in deducting the necessary contributions from the em-
ployees' wages, is a gratuitous agent and as such does not owe a duty
to the employee."' Also, many cases have held that the employer as
master policyholder is under no duty to keep the policy in force
or to give notice that it has been terminated or modified." 7 However,
even where the insured or his beneficiary does have a cause of action
against the policyholder, it might be impossible for him to realize any
recovery from a judgment on his behalf." 8
The most important reason why the master policyholder should be
regarded as the agent of the insurer is that under such a rule the in-
surer's responsibilities for the master policyholder's actions or lack of
action will result in the payment of benefits without the necessity of
the insured or his beneficiary to resort to litigation." 9 In the absence
of such clearly defined responsibilities, resort to legal process may be-
come necessary. Such a result would be highly unfair because, through
no fault of his own, the insured or the beneficiary must seek the advice
and services of an attorney to obtain the benefits to which, it is sub-
mitted, he is entitled. This may be quite an onerous task since it may
be uneconomic to hire professional assistance due to the small amount
of money which is often involved.
III. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As may be seen from the foregoing discussion, the most equitable
result would appear in most cases to be a finding of an agency relation-
116. Thompson v. Pacific Mills, 141 S.C. 303, 139 S.E. 619 (1927).
117. See Note, The Requirement of Notice to an Employee of the Termination or
Cancellation of His Group Policy, 42 NoTRE DAmm LAwYER 523 (1966-67); Note,
Cancellation of Group Insurance Policy By Employer Without Consent of Employee, 49
YALE L.J. 585 (1940).
118. See Boger v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 259 N.C. 125, 130 S.E.2d 64 (1963).
119. See Hanaieff v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952)
(Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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ship between the insurer and the master policyholder."0 However, it
is important that the courts maintain a flexible approach. Such an
approach was suggested in 1935 when group insurance was still in its
infancy by Frank W. Hanft, who wrote:1""
Courts have taken great pains to determine whether the em-
ployer is the agent of the insurance company or not. Better
results might have been achieved had they gone directly to the
problem of determining whether, in view of the way group insur-
ance is set up and operated, and of the relations and character of
the parties, the employer should be charged with the performance
of certain functions on behalf of the insurance company. If it is
found that the employer should be held to act for the company in
certain particulars, it is not objectionable to describe the result by
saying that the employer is the company's agent for those pur-
poses. If it is determined that in other particulars the employer's
acts should not be chargeable to the insurance company, it is
equally unobjectionable to label this result by stating that the
employer is not the company's agent for those other purposes.
The harm comes in reversing the process. When courts first ex-
amine the question whether under the law the employer is an
agent, find he is not, and then decide that therefore he is not to
be charged with certain functions on behalf of the insurance
company, the law does not serve group insurance, but group in-
surance the law.
This approach seems to have been used by the Louisiana court in
the leading case of Neider v. Continental Assurance Co.' 22 There the
plaintiff-beneficiary was allowed to recover on a group life insurance
policy insuring her husband's life where, due to the employer-master
policyholder's complicated accounting system, the insured mistakenly
believed he was up to date on his premium payments. The insurer
resisted payment on the grounds that the policy, as per the certificate,
had terminated for failure to pay premiums. The court was impressed
by the complicated nature of the accounting system and concluded
that the employer was under a duty to inform the employee as to what
date his insurance premiums had been paid through payroll deduc-
120. See text accompanying notes 28-50, supra.
121. Hanft, Group Life Insurance: Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAw & Co xmp. PoB. 70,
86 (1935).
122. 213 La. 621, 35 So. 2d 237, Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 852 (1948).
407
Washington Law Review Vol. 46: 377, 1971
tions. The opinion emphasized that the social usefulness of group in-
surance would suffer if poor administration of the policy could defeat
an insured's coverage.
The court in Neider did not approach the problem posed-whether
the beneficiary could recover from the insurer-by first determining
the agency characterization of the employer. Rather, it looked to the
facts of the case and determined that a grave injustice would be done,
both to the individual beneficiary and to group insurance, if the in-
surer would not be held responsible for the negligence of the master
policyholder. Finding the master policyholder to be the agent after
this inquiry is far superior to the approach which considers the
agency point first, since under the former the equities of the facts can
be considered while under the latter they cannot.
Another method of analysis is to distinguish clerical duties from
discretionary duties. Under this method a determination that the duties
are clerical would imply a master policyholder-insurer agency whereas
a finding that the duties are discretionary would not. Thus, the char-
acterization of a relationship as that of agency would depend in turn
upon how certain duties are characterized. The author of this sugges-
tion characterizes receipt and forwarding of premiums, forwarding
applications and recording of beneficiaries as clerical duties, and duties
involving termination of policies, determination of employment status,
and waiver of policy provisions as discretionary duties. 23
This suggestion comes close to the Hanft suggestion in that the first
inquiry should be as to the functional relationship between the parties
and the result would be a finding of agency for some purposes but not
for others. A criticism of the clerical/discretionary characterization,
however, is that it does not involve a clear consideration of policy;
that is, it does not ask the question of whether the insurer should be
held responsible for the acts of the master policyholder.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the courts should consider closely the facts of
each case to determine whether the insurer should be held responsible
123. Note, Group Insurance Policies: The EmployerlInsurance Agency Relationship,
1968 DuE L.J. 824.
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for the acts of the master policyholder,'2 4 instead of approaching the
cases from a standpoint of whether or not the the master policyholder
is the agent of the insurer in performing certain functions. That is,
the courts should look at the equities of the situation rather than the
agency position of the parties.
In executing this approach, certain factors should be kept in mind:
1. The insurer rather than the insured is in a better position to
control the conduct of the master policyholder.
2. The insurer is in a better position to recoup some of the losses
occasioned by the master policyholder's conduct. For example, in a
situation where the insurer must pay benefits on a policy which the
master policyholder never should have issued in the first place, the in-
surer would be in a better position to sue the master policyholder for
his negligence than would the individual insured. Further, the insurer
is in a position to spread the risks throughout the participants in the
group insurance plan.
3. It should be determined whether, under the circumstances, the
insured was justified in his reliance that he was in fact covered by
the terms of the policy.
4. It should be recognized that to the insured the group insurance
contract is one of adhesion which he must accept as is.
5. It should be borne in mind that the institution of group insur-
ance will lose some of its usefulness if its image can be tarnished by
poor administration.
Stephen K. Eugster*
124. (T)he judicial approach has too frequently been in terms of an attempted
mechanical application of an all too vague agency concept, rather than on the basis
of a recognition of the employee's necessary reliance on the employer for contact
with the insurer.
Note, Some Economic and Legal Aspects of Group Insurance Policies, 36 CoLU. L.
PIy. 89, 99 (1936) (footnotes omitted).
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n. B. A., University of Denver, 1966; J. D.,
University of Washington, 1969.
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